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YOU CAN LEAD A HORSE TO WATER:
HELLER AND THE FUTURE OF SECOND
AMENDMENT SCHOLARSHIP
ERIC RUBEN & JOSEPH BLOCHERt

When the Supreme Court decided Districtof Columbia v. Heller,1
it not only inaugurated a new era of constitutional doctrine, but also
helped create a burgeoning new field of legal scholarship.
Ten years after Heller, and despite a relative lack of further
guidance from the Justices, the doctrinal revolution has started to
stabilize into a doctrinal framework. In "From Theory to Doctrine: An
'2
Empirical Analysis of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms after Heller,
we report the results of a comprehensive case-coding project involving
more than 1,000 Second Amendment challenges. The data show the
contours of the evolving doctrine, illustrating areas of substantive and
methodological settlement, uncertainty, and divergence.
The scholarly revolution, meanwhile, is still very much underway.
Observers have noted that legal scholarship played a prominent role in
Heller's recognition of the "individual" right to keep and bear arms.'
Now, on the tenth anniversary of the decision, the Duke Law Journal
has assembled a rich, diverse, and thoughtful set of perspectives about
the Second Amendment, constitutional interpretation, politics, and the
t Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, and Fellow, Brennan Center
for Justice at New York University School of Law; Lanty L. Smith '67 Professor of Law Duke
Law School.
1. 554 UJ.S. 570 (2008).
2. Eric Ruben& Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An EmpiricalAnalysis of the
Right to Keep and Bear Arms afterHeller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433 (2018).
3. ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN
AMERICA 95 96 (2011) (dcscribing scholarship in the dccades leading up to Heller); see also
JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A.H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT: RIGHTS,
REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER 63 (2018) (same).
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role of the courts.4 Each of the articles in this symposium suggests
important ways in which our empirical analysis can be elaborated,
refined, or clarified-some of which we hope to accomplish in new
empirical projects. We are immensely grateful to each of the authors
for their engagement and insight.
But the contributions to this symposium are even more significant
for what they say (and show) about the future of Second Amendment
scholarship more generally. Perhaps the most important fact in that
regard is that we are entering, as Sandy Levinson notes, "a new area of
American constitutional law about an unusually hot-button subject."5
In their contribution, Ronald Wright and Mark Hall emphasize the
ways in which content analysis of the kind we pursue in our article
could contribute to scholarly collaboration in "the development of an
important new field of legal doctrine." 6
Whether and how a field of scholarship will coalesce around this
new field of doctrine is the question that most interests us here. There
can be little doubt about the practical importance of weapon rights and
regulation-with 100,000 Americans shot every year,7 the stakes are
high-or the novelty of the problems that accompany the
implementation of what is essentially a new constitutional right. But
Second Amendment law might nonetheless be "the law of the horse,"
as Frank Easterbrook memorably suggested of cyber law in the mid1990s: a subject best learned through the study of general rules. '
As far as we are aware, there is no accepted definition for what

4. Michael C. Dorf, The Constitutional Politics Hellcr Launched, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 8
(2018); David Kopel, Data IndicateSecond Amendment Underenflorcement,68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE
(forthcoming 2018); Sanford Levinson, Comment on Ruben and Blocher: Too Damn Many Cases,
and an Absent Supreme Court,68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 17 (2018); Darrell A. H. Miller, Romanticism
Meets Realism in Second Amendment Adjudication, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 34 (2018); George A.
Mocsary, A Close Reading of an Excellent Distant Reading of Heller in the Courts, 68 DuKE L.J.
ONLINE41 (2018): Adam M. Samaha & Roy Germano, Is the Second Amendment A Second-Class
Right?, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 57 (2018); Ronald F. Wright & Mark A. Hall, Collaborate
Constructionof'a New Legal Field, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 70 (2018).
5. Levinson, supra note 4, at 20.
6. Wright and Hall, supra note 4, at 76.
7.
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, WEB-BASED INJURY STATISTICS OUERY AND
REPORTING SYSTEM. RETRIEVED, https://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/index.html (last visited

May 3, 2018) [https://pcrma.cc/3EFN-SC4G].
8. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. L. FORUM
207, 207 ("[T]he best way to learn the law applicable to specialized endeavors isto study general
rules. Lots of cases deal with sales of horses; others deal with people kicked by horses; still more
deal with the licensing and racing of horses, or with the care veterinarians give to horses, or with
prizes at horse shows. Any effort to collect these strands into a course on 'TheLaw of the Horse'
is doomed to be shallow and to miss unifying principles.").
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constitutes a "field" of legal study, and it is far beyond the scope of this
short response (or the ambitions of its authors) to attempt such a thing.
But we do think-as responses to Easterbrook suggested 9- that there
is something to be gained from the particularized consideration of
Second Amendment law. And, for much the same reason, we think that
it has many characteristics that one would associate with a standalone
field of legal study. As we see it, in order to have a legitimate claim to
that label, an issue must have a distinct set of important, interesting and
unanswered legal questions, rich and reliable resources with which to
answer them, and a critical mass of scholars.
Second Amendment scholarship satisfies this rough and imperfect
tripartite test. By establishing a new constitutional right, and
identifying (but doing little to explain) a set of permissible regulations
of that right, Heller generated as many fundamental and unanswered
doctrinal and theoretical questions as any other area of constitutional
law. These include not only specific questions about which arms,
activities, and people are covered by the right to keep and bear arms,
but more foundational questions about the purpose of the right1" and
how Second Amendment doctrine does or should protect its own
announced "core" value of self-defense." Especially since the Justices
themselves have been generally "absent" from the doctrinal field, 2
scholars have played an unusually prominent role in characterizing and
helping to shape the contours of the right to keep and bear arms.
While there is still much room in the conversation, and a serious
need for greater diversity, the increasing number of scholarly voices
has enriched the discourse immeasurably. After all, the "Constitution
of Conversation," as Levinson puts it, 3 requires interlocutors. Few
scholars list the Second Amendment or firearms as a primary research
interest, but that, too, is changing. And as this symposium
demonstrates, scholars whose primary interests lie elsewhere-in
constitutional theory, empirics, history, institutional analysis, and so
on -can usefully bring their tools to bear.
Those scholars have an increasingly rich set of resources on which
9. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV.
501, 502 (1999) (arguing that "there is an important general point that comes from thinking in
particular about how law and cyberspace connect").
10. BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 3, at 148-72 (considering three different possible
theories of the Second Amendment in light of Heller).
11. Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self Defense and the Second Amendment (work-inprogress on file with authors).
12. Levinson, supra note 4, at 17.
13. Id. at 20.
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to draw. By "resources" we simply mean the basic materials of
scholarly inquiry-the grist for the scholarly mill. That of course
includes the standard materials of legal reasoning: constitutional text,
cases, statutes, and the like, as well as efforts to synthesize them. 4 In
Second Amendment scholarship, it also includes insights drawn from
history,15 sociology,16 psychiatry," political science, 8 philosophy, 9 and
other disciplines and methodologies, including (as with our article)
empirical legal studies.
This new field of scholarship, like others that have preceded it, will
face fundamental questions about its own scope and ambitionquestions that are, almost by definition, far beyond our ability to
answer here. The scope and strength of the right to keep and bear arms,
its relationship to other constitutional rights and values, and the proper
role of courts in enforcing it are the kinds of inquiries that should
animate scholarship for decades to come. Nevertheless, we can hazard
a few guesses about common themes that are likely to emerge, and

14. At one time, the creation of a field might have been achieved through the writing of a
treatise or casebook; Hart & Wechsler's Federal Courts is perhaps the best-known example within
public law. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953); see also James E. Pfander, Fifty Years (More or Less) of "Federal
Courts": An Anniversary Review, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1083 (2002). We are aware of two
firearms law casebooks, each with significant virtues, though neither has yet had the same
catalyzing effect. See NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON, DAVID B. KOPEL, GEORGE A. MOCSARY &
MICHAEL P. O'SHEA, FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS,
AND POLICY (2012); ANDREW MCCLURG & BRANNON DENNING, GUNS AND THE LAW: CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND EXPLANATION

(2017).

15. See, e.g., PATRICK CHARLES, ARMED AMERICA: A HISTORY OF GUN RIGHTS FROM
COLONIAL MILITIAS TO CONCEALED CARRY (2018); AKINYELE UMOJA, WE WILL SHOOT
BACK: ARMED RESISTANCE IN THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM MOVEMENT (2013) (detailing use of

firearms to fight local oppression during the civil rights movement); Saul Cornell, The Right to
Keep and CarryArms in Anglo-American Law: PreservingLiberty and Keeping the Peace,80 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 11 (2(117) (arguing that Heller erred in its emphasis on a "static" rather than
a "dynamic" history of firearms in early American history).
16.

See, e.g., JENNIFER CARLSON, CITIZEN-PROTECTORS: THE EVERYDAY POLITICS OF

GUNS IN AN AGE OF DECLINE (2015) (analyzing how men embrace gun culture in response to
socioeconomic decline); ANGELA STROUD, GOOD GUYS WITH GUNS: THE APPEAL AND

CONSEQUENCES OF CONCEALED CARRY (2016) (examining how perceptions about conceal carry
vary by race, gender, and socioeconomic status).
17. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Swanson ct al., Implementation and LFtctiveness of Connecticut's
Risk-Based Gun Removal Law: Does it Prevent Suicides?, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179
(2017) (exploring the impact of gun regulations on suicide rates); Fredrick E. Vars, Self Deknse
Against Gun Suicide, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1465 (2015) (same).
18.

See, e.g., ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL (2014); KRISTIN A.

Goss, DISARMED: THE MISSING MOVEMENT FOR GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (2008)
(examining political constraints on gun-regulation advocates).
19. See, e.g., FIRMIN DEBRABANDER, Do GUNS MAKE US FREE? DEMOCRACY AND THE
ARMED SOCIETY (2015) (arguing that an armed citizenry leads to a less free society).
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which the contributions to this symposium illustrate.
First, and perhaps most obviously (since it most closely echoes the
political version of the gun debate), is the question of how robust the
right to keep and bear arms is or should be. Heller did not settle that
question; fundamental normative and descriptive baselines have yet to
be established. Even an empirical study like ours, which is primarily
descriptive and analytic, inevitably intersects with normative
questions.2t Perhaps the most prominent such question with regard to
the Second Amendment is whether it is being treated,
as Justice
21
Thomas and others have put it, as a "second class right.1
The symposium contributions from David Kopel, George
Mocsary, and Adam Samaha and Roy Germano all engage that
question, and they do so with a variety of methodologies, including
alternative empirical measurements, a more qualitative evaluation of
the cases,23 and suggestions for future work.24 We particularly
appreciate Mocsary's observation that empirical projects could "afford
scholars on different sides of this issue an opportunity to work together
on mutual projects, which would have its own benefits for the area of
study."25 Wright and Hall similarly note that "[f]uture courts and
scholars can build on this work, making possible consensus-on the
descriptive level-in this constitutional field where scholarly
20. Ruben & Blocher, supra note 2, at 1438.
21. Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2292 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("In
construing the statute before us expansively so that causing a single minor reckless injury or
offensive touching can lead someone to lose his right to bear arms forever, the Court continues
to 'rclcgat[c] the Second Amendment to a second-class right."' (quoting Friedman v. City of
Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 450 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from dcnial of certiorari))).
22. Samaha & Gcrmano, supra note 4, at 61; see also Adam M. Samaha & Roy Gcrmano,
Are Commercial Speech Cases Ideological? An Empirical Inquiry, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
827,829 (2017).
23. In particular, our data does not "weigh" challcngcs onc result counts as much as
another, regardless of which court decided it or whether the decision was interlocutory or final.
We emphasized this point in our article, Ruben & Blochcr, supra note 2, at 1468, and we
appreciate Kopel's elaboration of its importance. His work with Grecnlec, which we cited,
provides the kind of qualitative analysis we envisioned.
But in one particularly important way, Kopel mischaracterizes our coding in his critique.
He says that we would code two Second Amendment wins for a case in which a court upholds, on
alternative grounds, a gun law at trial and on appeal. This is simply incorrect-such a case would
be coded as two losses. Ruben & Blocher, supra note 2, at 146263. As we explain in the article,
our unit of analysis with regard to losses is the challenge, not the grounds thcrefor. If a court
accepts ten arguments in favor of striking down a gun law but nonetheless upholds it on the basis
of another (deference to the political branches, for example, as in Kopel's hypothetical), that
counts as one Second Amendment loss and no Second Amendment wins. See Kopel, supra note
4.
24. Mocsary, supra note 4, at 52-55.
25. Id.at 55.
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collaboration once seemed too much to ask. 2 6
That leads to the second theme we hope and expect to see in
Second Amendment scholarship: an increasingly broad and diverse set
of scholarly tools and methodologies. Because the "individual" right to
keep and bear arms is such a recent arrival in federal constitutional law,
its future development has the benefit of a wealth of scholarship about
constitutional theory and doctrine more generally.27 As a point of
contrast, First Amendment doctrine largely took shape before the
major debates in constitutional theory over the past few decades, and
stare decisis insulates that framework from change. Second
Amendment scholars have a comparatively rich toolkit to use, and on
problems that are not yet governed by case law.
Naturally, the Court's decision in Heller will remain central to the
scholarly discussion. One goal of our study is to show its impact, and
thereby to enable a deeper and more accurate analysis of its doctrinal
legacy a decade after it was decided. Formally speaking, that doctrinal
development will continue to proceed within contours derived from
Heller, but precisely what those contours are remains to be determined.
And the fact that Heller will remain on the books does not mean that
critiques of it are no longer important or legitimate. As Dorf
demonstrates, they are deeply relevant to the constitutional politics of
gun rights and regulation."
Perhaps even more fundamental than the doctrinal debates-as
Levinson and Dorf in particular emphasize-are extra-judicial and
even extra-legal understandings of the Second Amendment. Levinson
draws attention to the "peculiar role that the 'Second Amendment'
plays as a myth and symbol in non-professional discussions about the
Constitution and its protection of individual rights."" Our focus on
doctrine in "From Theory to Doctrine" should not be taken as a
suggestion otherwise. Popular understandings and invocations of the
Second Amendment remain a far more important barrier to gun
regulation than the courts.3 0 As Dorf notes, "No matter how many
state, lower federal, or even Supreme Court rulings uphold firearms
regulations, the Second Amendment stands as a potent symbol and
rallying cry for those who wish to exercise political power and eliminate

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Wright & Hall, supra note 4, at 76.
Many thanks to Darrell Miller for this point.
Dorf, supra note 4, at 13 14.
Levinson, supra note 4, at 21.
Joseph Blocher, Gun Rights Talk, 94 B.U. L. REV. 813,832 (2014)
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such regulations."31
Recognizing the limited reach of constitutional doctrine does not
mean resorting to shallow politics. One can study and even engage in
the gun debate without adopting its bitter partisanship, instead using it
as a lens through which to evaluate broader legal phenomena. The
right to keep and bear arms provides an unusually and perhaps
uniquely useful means to analyze more general questions regarding the
role of courts (as Levinson does) or constitutional politics (as Dorf
does). One might, for example, define the right to keep and bear arms
functionally rather than formally, considering not only the
constitutional law of the Second Amendment, but the myriad legal
materials and practices that together insulate gun possession and use
from legal regulation. 2
In "From Theory to Doctrine," we attempt to characterize the
early years of a new field of constitutional doctrine. This symposium
demonstrates the concomitant growth of new scholarship surrounding
the right to keep and bear arms. Ten years ago, there was reason to
believe that Second Amendment doctrine would-following elements
of Heller-become rigid and binary. Scholarship might have followed
the same path; digging into the pre-Heller trenches and pitting "progun" against "pro-regulation" views. Our empirical study shows that
the doctrinal reality is far more nuanced and interesting. So, we hope
and expect, is the scholarly future.

31. Dorf, supra note 4, at 16.
32. Here we are borrowing from Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution,
117 YALE L.J. 408,410-11 (2007).

